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Progress in monitoring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is exam­
ined, beginning with the 2002 National Academy of Sciences CTBT study, followed by 
recent ﬁndings on regional seismology, array-monitoring, correlation-detection, seismic 
modeling, and non-seismic technologies. The NAS-CTBT study concluded that the fully 
completed International Monitoring System (IMS) will reliably detect and identify un­
derground nuclear explosions with a threshold of 0.1 kt in hard rock, if conducted any­
where in Europe, Asia, North Africa, and North America. In some locations the threshold 
is 0.01 kt or lower, using arrays or regional seismic stations, but with an increase in back­
ground events. As an example, the 0.6-kiloton North Korean test of October 9, 2006 was 
promptly detected by seismometers in Australia, Europe, North America, and Asia. The 
P/S ratio between 1–15 Hz clearly showed that the event was an explosion and not an 
earthquake. The advances in seismic monitoring, described in this article, strengthen 
the conclusions of the NAS study. Interferometric synthetic aperture radar can, in some 
cases, identify and locate 1-kt tests at 500 m depth by measuring subsidence to 2–5 mm. 
InSAR can discriminate between earthquakes and explosions from the subsidence pat­
tern. InSAR will not give a rapid response, but InSAR can locate nuclear tests to within 
100 meters, excellent for on-site inspections. Cooperative monitoring can detect yields 
of 10 kg next to a test site and less than a gram when two meters from experiments 
without revealing nuclear secrets. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explo­
sions (including peaceful nuclear explosions) of any yield in all places for all 
time. The United States signed the CTBT in 1996, but the U.S. Senate denied 
advice and consent to CTBT ratiﬁcation in 1999. One factor in the Senate debate 
was concern on how well a test ban could be monitored. This article discusses 
progress in monitoring technologies since the 1999 Senate defeat. These results 
will be used to determine whether the CTBT is effectively veriﬁable in a future 
paper.1 
2002 NATIONAL ACADEMY STUDY ON CTBT 
The 2002 National Academy of Sciences CTBT Study examined the ability of the 
CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor seismic, infrasound, 
hydroacoustic, and radionuclide signals.2,3 Of these, seismic detection is the 
most important, but the other sensors make signiﬁcant contributions. 
Improvements in Seismic Monitoring 
Seismic signals are grouped into teleseismic waves and regional waves, 
depending on the observation distance. Teleseismic waves propagate as body 
waves through the interior of the earth—through the crust into the mantle and 
back through the crust—at distances greater than 2000 km at higher frequen­
cies (0.2 to 3 Hz), or as low frequency (0.05 Hz) surface waves. Amplitudes of 
teleseismic waves are not greatly diminished at distances between 2000 and 
9000 km, making them suitable to measure events outside country borders. 
The longitudinal, pressure P waves are readily excited by explosions and they 
arrive ﬁrst. The transverse, shear S waves are readily excited by earthquakes 
and arrive after the P wave. NAS results were based on the ability to monitor 
both teleseismic waves and regional waves at closer distances. 
The seismic mb magnitude is based on the initial amplitude of 1-Hertz, 
pressure waves, which is used to estimate yield in kilotons (kt). To ﬁrst order a 
1-kt explosion, tamped in hard rock, has a magnitude of about 4 at the Nevada 
Test Site. Geological strata absorb seismic waves differently, thus different bias 
corrections are needed for each test site when converting magnitudes to yields.4 
Progress in seismology has lowered the problem-event threshold by two magni­
tude mb units, from 4.3–5.6 thirty years ago to 2.0–3.5 today, lowering problem-
event yields by a factor of more than 100.5 With the advent of high-quality 
broadband seismographs and more seismic stations, seismic research is now 
focused on regional seismic waves that travel on the surface and in the crust. 
Advances in regional seismology, discussed in more detail in later sections, con­
vinced the NAS panel to lower the IMS threshold detection level from 1 kt 
to 0.1 kt, which clearly enhances CTBT monitoring. Lower magnitude events 
imply lower yields, which are less militarily signiﬁcant. 
The lowered threshold also brings with it an increase in background 
events, from 7000 earthquakes per year over magnitude 4 to 60,000 per year 
over magnitude 3. Several criteria are used to distinguish explosions from 
earthquakes. For one, most of the events can be ruled out because they take 
place below the oceans or at great depths. The ratio of P to S waves and other 
considerations can further discriminate, as discussed in Regional Seismology 
Monitoring. 
NAS-CTBT conclusions are based on a completed International Monitoring 
System, called for by the CTBT. The IMS plan and status today are discussed 
in more detail in the section International Monitoring System. In summary, 
the IMS will consist of 321 monitoring stations for seismic (50 primary and 
120 auxiliary), hydroacoustic (11), radionuclide (80), and infrasound (60) sen­
sors, together with 16 certiﬁed laboratories. IMS seismic stations use broad­
band sensors that detect both teleseismic body waves at lower frequencies and 
regional waves at higher frequencies, increasing the ability to make spectral 
comparisons to enhance source discrimination. Digital records are obtained for 
motion in three directions (up/down, north/south, east/west). Of the 50 primary 
IMS stations, 19 will use triple-axis sensors and 30 will use arrays of vertical-
motion sensors. The arrays consist of 9 to 25 sensors, spread over several square 
kilometers. Estimates of the network threshold depend on local seismic noise, 
sensor type and quality, magnitude and type of seismic waves, and the ability to 
use waveform shapes to discriminate between nuclear explosions, earthquakes, 
and conventional (ripple-ﬁred) chemical explosions. 
Seismic threshold-detection contours from the NAS-CTBT panel are shown 
in Figure 1, with a signal-to-noise ratio greater than 3.2 (corresponding to 10 
decibels) at three or more IMS-primary stations (solid squares). The IMS should 
detect 90 percent of events (high conﬁdence, as deﬁned by the Intelligence Com­
munity) at contour edges at the threshold magnitudes. NAS-CTBT’s detection 
threshold for the primary network for Europe, Asia, North Africa, and North 
America is between 3 and 3.5 mb. It is lower in places with array stations and 
seismographs at closer locations. Threshold levels will improve with further 
research on regional waves and with the addition of new technical capabilities 
described in this article. 
The magnitude contours of Figure 1 are translated into explosive-yield con­
tours in Figure 2, as described on page 41 of the NAS study: 3.5 mb(0.1 kt), 
3.25(0.06 kt), 3(0.03 kt), 2.75(0.02 kt), 2.5(0.01 kt), 2(0.003 kt).6 For most of 
Eurasia and North Africa this corresponds to a 0.03–0.1 kt yield from a tamped 
explosion (where the nuclear device is in direct contact with hard rock). The con­
tours are given in tons and are 90%-probable for at least 3-station detection in 
the 50-primary stations network. Using seismic arrays, the threshold detection 
level at the former Soviet test site at Novaya Zemlya is between 2.0 and 2.5 mb, 
corresponding to 0.003 to 0.01 kt. These results are consistent with other esti­
mates: Sykes/Evernden (1982),7 Sykes, Evernden, Cifuentes (1983),8 Evernden, 
Archambeau (1986),9 Hannon (1985, 1988),10 OTA (1988),11 Claassen, Unger, 
Leith (1993),12 and Provisional CTBTO Technical Secretariat (2006).13 
Figure 1: IMS Detection Thresholds in Seismic Units (mb). Contours of seismic magnitude for 
which signals would be expected (with signal-to-noise ratio greater than 3.2, that is, 10 dB) 
at three or more stations of the IMS primary seismic network (solid squares) from 90 percent 
of the events at the contour magnitude. The interval between contours is 0.25 mb units 
(Center for Monitoring Research, Nuclear Testing Programs, Department of Defense, in 
Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, National Academy 
of Sciences, National Academy Press, 2002, p. 52.). 
NAS-Panel Conclusions 
The NAS panel assumed that all elements of the IMS are deployed and 
supported at their full capability: !	 Underground explosions can be detected and can be identiﬁed as explosions, 
using IMS data, down to a yield of 0.1 kt [tamped] in hard rock if conducted 
anywhere in Europe, Asia, North America, and North Africa. In some loca­
tions of interest, such as Novaya Zemlya, this capability extends down to 
0.01 kt or less. Depending on the medium in which the identiﬁed explosion 
occurs, its actual yield could vary from the hard rock value over a range 
given by multiplying or dividing by a factor of about 10, corresponding, re­
spectively, to the extremes represented by a test in deep unconsolidated dry 
sediments (very poor coupling) and a test in a water-saturated environment 
(excellent coupling). Positive identiﬁcation as a nuclear explosion, for testing 
less than a few kilotons, could require on-site inspection unless there is de­
tectable venting of radionuclides. Attribution would likely be unambiguous. !	 Atmospheric explosions can be detected and identiﬁed as nuclear, using 
IMS data, with high conﬁdence above 0.5 kt on continents in the northern 
hemisphere and above 1 kt worldwide, and possibly at much lower yields for 
many sub-regions. Although attribution could be difﬁcult based on IMS data 
alone, evaluation of other information (including that obtained by National 
Technical Means (NTM)) could permit an unambiguous determination. 
Figure 2: IMS Detection Thresholds in Explosive Yield (tons). Contours of approximate yield 
in tons for tamped explosions, for which detection is expected at three IMS primary stations 
(solid squares). These contours are determined from the magnitude contours in Figure 1, 
but with an expanded view of Europe, Asia, and North Africa. [DOD/CMR] 
!	 Underwater explosions in the ocean can be reliably detected and identiﬁed 
as explosions using IMS data, at yields down to 0.001 kt or even lower. 
Positive identiﬁcation as a nuclear explosion could require debris collection. 
Attribution might be difﬁcult to establish unless additional information was 
available, as it might be, from NTM. !	 Explosions in the upper atmosphere and near space can be detected and 
identiﬁed as nuclear, with suitable instrumentation, with great conﬁdence 
for yields above about a kiloton to distances up to about 100 million kilome­
ters from Earth. (This capability is based on the assumption that relevant 
instruments that have been proposed for deployment on the follow-on sys­
tem for the DSP satellites will in fact be funded and installed.) !	 A fully-decoupled explosion of larger than 1–2 kt cannot be conﬁdently hid­
den in a cavity and it would be very difﬁcult at that level. (This will be 
further examined in the forthcoming paper on effective veriﬁcation.) 
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM 
The last Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty took place in Vienna during September 17–18, 2007. 
Of the 177 states that signed as of September 2007, 106 sent delegations, includ­
ing Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, with several states represented at the Minister 
or Deputy Minister level. At the end of 2006, 184 of the 321 IMS stations were 
certiﬁed, 60 were operational but not certiﬁed, 19 were under construction, 21 
Table 1: Status of the station installation program as of December 31, 2006. 
[CTBTO] 
Installation complete 
Contract 
Not Under under Not 
IMS station type Certified certified construction negotiation started 
Primary seismic 36 (72%) 6 2 2 4 
Auxiliary seismic 61 (51%) 38 2 9 10 
Hydroacoustic 9 (82%) 1 1 0 0 
Infrasound 37 (62%) 1 4 6 12 
Radionuclide 41 (51%) 14 10 4 11 
Total 184 60 19 21 37 
were under negotiation, and 37 had not started (Table 1). In addition, 9 of the 
16 radionuclide laboratories were certiﬁed. It is reasonable to assume that the 
last 10% of the stations will not be certiﬁed for a decade or so because of difﬁcult 
political or geographic situations, giving a 90%-complete IMS in perhaps 2010. 
International Data Centre 
Events that have not been screened out are initially placed on the Standard 
Event Lists 0, 1, 2, and 3 after 0.3, 2, 6, and 12 hours, respectively. The auto­
matic Standard Event List 3 received an average of 122 events per day in 2006, 
with 76 placed on the Reviewed Event Bulletin. Waveform events (seismic, 
infrasound, hydroacoustic) are moved to the Reviewed and Standard Event Bul­
letin after 1 day and to the Standard Screened Event Bulletin after 2 days. The 
latency period on the Reviewed Event Bulletin is 8 days, which is greater than 
the 3-day goal. Computer software is being replaced at the rate of $2–4 million 
per year to improve this situation. The travel time for radionuclide nuclei is 1 to 
2 weeks. 
Communications 
The International Data Centre (IDC) sent 1,600,000 subscription data 
sets in 2006 to 808 end-users in 94 countries at 8 gigabytes per day. Per­
formance tests assessed reliability and security of the IMS network and the 
Global Communications Infrastructure that connects IMS stations to the IDC. 
The main causes of problems at waveform stations were software (now be­
ing addressed), power supply, remote computers, digitizers, and data authen­
tication. The Global Communication Infrastructure sent 8.3 gigabytes/day in 
2006, which was 99.6% available (97.9% with planned outages), with a con­
tractual requirement of 99.5%. As of December 2006, there were 208 very 
small aperture satellite terminals (84% of the 248-planned total), with 240 
site surveyed (97%). The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) uses quality 
management systems (QMS) to assess planning, monitoring, data analysis, and 
operations. 
Danger Signs 
The United States has lost its voting rights in the Preparatory Commis­
sion for the CTBTO. According to the Resolution Establishing the Preparatory 
Commission for the CTBTO (adopted in 1996), “a state-signatory which has 
not discharged in full its ﬁnancial obligations within 365 days of receipt . . .  
shall have no vote in the Commission.” As of October 5, 2007, the United States 
was in arrears by $24 million (M). This is partially driven by the fact that the 
United States will not fund on-site inspection activities because it does not 
wish the CTBT to enter-into-force. But the short-fall is greater than this issue, 
driven by those that wish to kill the CTBT. For Fiscal Year 2006, the United 
States contributed $14.4 M of the $22 M request, and for FY2007, the United 
States contributed $10.5 M of the $23.4 M request, which is exacerbated by 
the different ﬁscal years. For FY2008, the Administration budgeted $18 M of 
the $23.4 M request, which is now under consideration by the Congress. Be­
cause the United States is the largest contributor to the CTBTO, these funding 
shortfalls have a signiﬁcant, adverse effect on the CTBTO with a budget of 
$110 M for FY2007. Brazil ($12 M) Argentina ($6.6 M) and others are also in 
arrears, with a total CTBTO arrears of $51 M. 
The CTBT Organization has 254 staff members (286 positions), which in­
cludes 163 professional (185 positions) from 66 states. About 45 of the profes­
sional employees come from the 5 nuclear weapon states. CTBTO is reorganiz­
ing the IMS Division to do engineering and maintenance on the IMS, whereas 
the IDC Division will operate the IMS and analyze IMS data. As the IMS is 
completed, plans are beginning to be made for the next generation of technol­
ogy, which is not yet budgeted. Professional employment is limited to seven 
years, complicating the work of IMS and IDC as talented technical staff must 
be replaced. 
System Performance 
The System Wide Performance Test (SPT1) “assesses the capacity of the 
functional elements currently in place, including the work processes support­
ing the achievement of performance targets, e.g., data availability and quality 
requirements, data processing and product and service delivery.” SPT1 results 
(December 2005 with 163 certiﬁed stations and 32 primary seismic stations) 
showed that IMS is generally fulﬁlling its goals, except that the threshold for 
the incomplete primary network is 0.3 mb higher than the ﬁnal goal in southern 
South America, East Asia, and Australia.14 The assessment indicated that fur­
ther tools are needed (1) to log and analyze problems, (2) to monitor and analyze 
operational status, (3) to develop O&M cost estimates, and (4) to measure IMS 
performance. 
Screening Criteria 
The IDC uses the screening criteria, listed in the following sections, to 
categorize events on its bulletins. The CTBT Protocol suggests additional ap­
proaches that could be used after further research.15 A parallel approach is 
used by the U.S. Data Center at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, which is oper­
ated by the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). Trained military 
personnel sift through data, using criteria similar to that used by the IDC. Un­
certainties surrounding possible problem events consume considerable effort, 
including that of outside experts. 
mb Threshold 
A threshold of 3.0–3.3 for the IDC is used at this time, but it could be 
lowered as analysis and equipment improve. Lowering the threshold increases 
false positives because there are 60,000 earthquakes/year with mb over 3, as 
compared to 7000/year with mb over 4. 
(mb–MS) > 1 
Explosions excite larger P waves (mb) than surface waves (MS) as compared 
to earthquakes of the same magnitude. MS often cannot be measured for small 
explosions, thus requiring regional seismic data to discriminate between source 
mechanisms. Recalibrated magnitude values are being examined for events 
below 3.5 mb.16 
Location 
Seventy percent of detected seismic events take place in the oceans, ruling 
out these events as nuclear explosions, unless there is a hydroacoustic signal 
with the characteristics of an explosion. Conversely, events near former nuclear 
test sites are examined much more thoroughly. An uncertainty in location area 
of 1000 km2 (18 km radius) can be difﬁcult to routinely achieve for small events 
when recorded by limited numbers of monitoring stations. However, location er­
rors are being reduced dramatically with the addition of more seismic stations, 
correlation analysis, InSAR, and 3D models.17 
Depth > 10 km 
Events that are conﬁdently located at greater than 5 km depth should be 
excluded, but this is relaxed to exclude events at depths over 10 km. 
Sharing Seismic Data 
Seismic monitoring is sizable and growing. The Global Seismic Network 
(GSN) has 143 seismic stations (October 2007, with 134 in real-time telemetry), 
surpassing its goal of 128 stations, and it continues to grow. There are thousands 
of seismometers beyond the IMS and GSN networks.18 Non-IMS stations sup­
plied excellent data on the 1998 India/Pakistan tests and the 2006 North Korean 
test. More seismographs enhance regional data capabilities. The Incorporated 
Research Institution for Seismology (IRIS) established GSN in 1986, to move 
beyond the obsolete, analogue Worldwide Standardized Seismograph Network. 
All GSN stations use digital data, which are freely available on the Internet in 
near–real time and from archival storage at the IRIS Data Management System 
(www.iris.edu).19 Broad-band GSN stations can detect very small events, such 
as nano-earthquakes near Hawaii with mb less than zero. Dial-up telephone 
access has been replaced with near–real time capabilities at 90% of the GSN 
sites through Internet and satellite connections. Over 50 GSN sites are now 
in the IMS auxiliary network, a trend that will grow. The other 80 GSN sites 
complement IMS coverage, giving additional, close-in regional data. Internet 
infrastructure has been enhanced in remote regions by GSN implementation. 
Operations and maintenance funding is provided by the U.S. Geological Sur­
vey for two-thirds of GSN sites. The National Science Foundation has bought 
equipment for many GSN sites, but increased NSF funding for hazard research 
after Katrina threatens funding for GSN operations and its ability to monitor 
central Asia. 
GSN’s primary purpose is basic science, which implies a long-term commit­
ment by professional seismologists to examine data, improve seismic models, 
and improve sensor systems. The caliber and size of this workforce is too ex­
pensive for IMS to replicate. Regional data would be greatly enhanced if more 
seismic stations were involved by sharing seismic data on a near–real time ba­
sis between the IDC, the GSN, and other selected seismic stations. This would 
increase the number and quality of experts to correct mistakes and improve 
analysis, which would have prevented U.S. mischaracterization of the 1997 
Kara Sea event. Data sharing with the 3000-station International Seismologi­
cal Centre would be less useful because the ISC receives only volunteer phase 
picks and not waveform data. The ISC bulletin is produced about two years in 
arrears, which is too late to be useful for explosion monitoring. But, some of 
this very large resource could be used to assist the IDC. 
REGIONAL SEISMOLOGY MONITORING 
Because the surface magnitude MS is difﬁcult to measure below magnitude 
4, it is imperative that regional seismic waves be utilized to discriminate be­
tween the possible sources of the seismic waves. Monitoring of regional waves 
has progressively replaced teleseismic signals as the yield threshold is now in 
the sub-kiloton region. Regional waves are used (1) to discriminate between 
seismic sources (explosions vs. earthquakes), (2) to determine the magnitude of 
the source, and (3) to determine the event location for attribution and on-site 
inspections. Regional waves predominately travel at depths less than 100 km 
and are strongly affected by local geology, which complicates interpretation. 
Regional wave amplitudes are typically larger at 1200 km than teleseismic am­
plitudes at 1800 km. The ability to monitor at regional distances increases as 
additional seismic stations are deployed. When there is a region of special con­
cern, seismographs can be located closer to the suspicious location. Regional 
wave magnitudes are referenced to teleseismic mb magnitudes to simplify dis­
cussion. Regional waves enhance the ability to detect cavity decoupling because 
higher frequency waves are more observable at regional distances and decou­
pling is smaller at higher frequencies (12 at 10 Hz), compared to teleseismic 
waves (70 at 1 Hz). The following regional waves are involved:20 
!	 Pn are relatively small longitudinal, pressure waves that arrive ﬁrst from 
beyond 100–200 km, mostly traveling below the crust-mantle boundary. !	 Pg waves arrive ﬁrst if closer than 100–200 km, traveling through “granitic” 
crust.!	 Lg are short period (1–6 s), large amplitude, transverse waves that arrive 
after P waves, propagating within the crust, but stopped by continental 
boundaries and reduced by some mountain ranges. !	 Sn are transverse, shear waves that arrive after Pn and before Lg, traveling 
below the crust-mantle boundary. !	 Coda waves are caused by backscattering from inhomogeneities in the crust 
and upper mantle, which appear long after the passage of body and surface 
waves. 
The prowess of regional seismology is seen by analysis of events at the Semi­
palatinsk test site. Only 271 of the 340 underground nuclear tests at the Semi­
palatinsk test site during 1961–1989 were reasonably well-documented in the 
West with well-determined origin times, coordinates, and magnitudes in the 
open technical literature, based on teleseismic signals. However, regional data 
for the remaining 69 tests became available after the Cold War from seismo­
graphs located 500–1500 km from Semipalitinsk Test Site. From this data, 
Khalturin, Rautian, and Richards assigned magnitudes to eight tests, which 
had been located but whose magnitudes were unknown.21 For 31 additional 
tests, they estimated origin time, magnitudes, and locations for 19 of these. Of 
the remaining 30 poorly documented and undetected tests, 15 had announced 
yields less than one ton and 13 occurred simultaneously with another test, 
which had been detected. Thus, there were only two tests, with announced 
yields over one ton, for which they were unable to ﬁnd seismic signals. This im­
pressive result was obtained from older analog data, now superseded by digital 
broadband sensors with high dynamic range, recording in the vertical and two 
horizontal directions. 
Event Discrimination 
Pn, Lg, and coda are regional waves that can be used to discriminate be­
tween possible seismic sources of an event (earthquake, chemical explosion, 
and nuclear explosion).22 
!	 There is much more diagnostic information in regional, broad-band spectra 
than in narrowband teleseismic signals associated with magnitudes mb and 
MS.23 !	 Pn, Sn, and Lg relative spectra are very similar for earthquakes between 
0.5–5 Hz.24 !	 P and Pn relative spectra are very similar for explosions. Sn and Lg vary 
signiﬁcantly from the P and Pn curves, predominately below 2 Hz, indicating 
that Sn and Lg are enhanced at lower frequencies for smaller/shallower 
explosions, more than one might expect. Deeply buried nuclear tests produce 
less Sn.!	 After corrections for differential attenuation, Pn/Sn ratios for explosions are 
very comparable between 4–6 Hz. The high frequency Pn/Sn ratio to the low 
frequency Pn/Sn ratio is 2 for earthquakes and 5 for explosions, suggesting 
that P/S ratios are a robust discriminant. Simulation modeling shows that 
P/S ratios might be robust to 3 mb. Pn/Lg ratios give useful discrimination 
to 1 kt, or perhaps lower. !	 Locations close to explosions have considerable high frequency content (10– 
100 Hz) compared to rock bursts.25 !	 Regional coda envelopes (0.03 to 8 Hz) give constant results by avoiding 
source and path heterogeneities that complicate interpretations of regional 
waves.26 Coda-derived Sn and Lg waveforms depend on depth of burial.27 !	 Small explosions within 10–20 m from inhomogeneous geologic structures 
convert some P wave amplitudes into S wave amplitudes at 50 Hz.28 Data 
obtained at less than 600 km from former test sites are used to differentiate 
between explosions and earthquakes.29 !	 New seismic stations have not had the opportunity to monitor nuclear tests, 
thus extrapolations from older data must be made to accommodate analysis 
of new sensors. 
Seismic Models 
Seismic data, obtained at the surface, give information about Earth’s inte­
rior, which in turn can be used to improve discrimination between earthquakes 
and explosions, as well as to improve location estimates.30 Models of the mantle, 
crust, and sedimentary structures are obtained from seismograms by following 
many ray paths between two locations. Such models are somewhat similar to 
x-ray catscans, but the analogy breaks down. Geotomography is less accurate 
than catscans, which are based on amplitude measurements along a straight-
line path. Catscans are transmission measurements at one x-ray frequency 
without reﬂection, refraction, or change in wave type (P to S, etc.) that can be 
measured at all positions outside the body. Geotomography depends on trans­
mission of a wide band of frequencies of many wave types that refract, reﬂect, 
and convert to another type that can not be simply disentangled by the sensor 
and cannot be measured at all positions. 
By inverting time segments, velocity and absorption maps are obtained in 1 
to 3 dimensions for different wave types within frequency bands. Velocity maps 
are used to calculate the passage of a given wave through the Earth, to predict 
the waveform at a receiving station. A conventional backward projection re­
verses the direction of seismic waves to locate the source position. Outlier data 
is removed by forward projecting waves from the calculated source location to 
all sensors, and then discarding data that arrives too far from the sensor that 
claimed to observe the event. By iterating back and forth, from seismic travel 
times to a velocity map and then from a velocity map to travel time and wave­
forms, seismic parameters are adjusted until calculated waveforms are simi­
lar to observed waveforms. Velocity and absorption vary along ray paths as a 
function of place, frequency, and wave type, complicating geotomography. Slow 
velocity regions usually have higher attenuation. Velocity and absorption pa­
rameters for the crust and upper mantle are model dependent, but modeling is 
extremely useful to discriminate between seismic sources and to reduce location 
errors, for example, from 25 km to 18 km in western Eurasia and North Africa. 
Location of Seismic Sources 
The location of a seismic event is usually determined by measuring the 
arrival times of various seismic waves at several locations. The two main causes 
of errors are (1) errors in travel times, and, more importantly, (2) velocity errors 
for seismic waves. By using a depth-dependent velocity model, travel times 
are converted to distances, which converge on the calculated event location. At 
depths greater than 200 km, velocity is accurate to about 1%, but velocity is only 
accurate to about 10% at shallower depths, which is relevant for regional waves 
in the crust and upper mantle. Seismic three-dimensional models reduce these 
errors because they are signiﬁcantly more accurate for regional waves than the 
depth-only models. 
A new approach uses cross-correlations between similar seismic events 
to reduce location errors by a factor of 10–100 over the approach based on 
travel times.31 For example, a regional wave traveling 500 km has a travel time 
of about 100 seconds. If there is a total 5% error in the velocity model, this 
corresponds to a location error of 25 km. But similar ray paths have very sim­
ilar velocity proﬁles so that relative locations can still be precisely estimated. 
With the advent of broad-band digital seismographs, greater analysis examines 
clusters of past events between neighboring sources and sensors and between 
a single source and neighboring sensors. This network of paired events reduces 
model errors caused by an unusual structure beneath a station or beneath the 
source. The double-difference method links neighboring events through travel-
time differences. It works best when events are separated by less than a few 
km. Cross-correlations are determined with a double difference approach, by 
using several regional stations separated by tens of km, and at distances up to 
100–1000 km from the event. This approach was applied to regions of China 
and North America, giving location errors as low as 0.15 km. Figure 3 shows 
a pair of similar events in China that were less than about 1 km apart. The 
applicability of this approach varies widely, to between 10 and 95% of seismic 
Figure 3: Chinese Earthquake Double. The waveforms of two earthquakes (in grey and 
black) are extremely similar over the 300–second cycle at regional distances. The 
cross-correlation approach determined the location of the second event to less than 1 km 
from the precursor, much superior to using travel times from phase picks (P. Richards et al., 
2006). 
events, depending greatly on the region, the amount of seismic activity, and the 
density of seismographs. This can be applied to areas of special concern, such 
as Lop Nor and Novaya Zemlya. As threshold levels lower with time, more past 
data is applicable. The key to this approach will be the long-term commitment 
to individual seismic stations to increase their waveform archives. 
SEISMIC ARRAYS 
Since the 1960s, NORSAR has operated arrays in Norway and Spitzbergen that 
combine signals from individual seismographs, greatly reducing local seismic 
noise and lowering threshold levels by 1 mb below that of seismic networks. 
The resultant seismic wave is beam-formed by grouping the signals from each 
sensor by varying arrival times based on theoretical relative arrival times for 
each sensor (similar to phase-array radar). By considering the phases of the 
individual waves, the beam-forming approach automatically provides locations 
of explosions and earthquakes. Events between 2 and 2.5 mb from over 2000 km 
away are detected and identiﬁed by seismic arrays, corresponding to less than 
0.01 kt for tamped yields and to less than 1 kt for explosions in large cavities. 
Waveform Correlation 
Problematic seismic signals were observed by Spitzbergen Array (1280 km 
distant) and NORSAR array (2320 km) from near Novaya Zemlya Test Site 
on August 16, 1997.32 The main event of 3.5 mb was followed four hours later 
by a small aftershock of 2.5 mb. The two waveforms were strongly correlated in 
timing and shape, indicating that the two events took place at the same location 
with the same source mechanism. The similarities showed that the second event 
was an aftershock to the ﬁrst signal, which was an earthquake in the Kara 
Sea and not a nuclear test. (See the discussion on Three Recent Nuclear-Test 
Events for more details.) In another experiment the NORSAR group used the 
template waveform from a 3.5 mb earthquake to detect and identify events as 
low as 0.5 mb at 600 km distance. The false alarm rate at large-aperture arrays 
is much less than at small-aperture arrays. The correlation approach is very 
powerful for studying events at nuclear test sites, and it now being extended to 
earthquakes and chemical explosions. 
Correlation Detection 
This approach was used to study 11 chemical explosions in cavities of 200 
to 1000 m3 at Alvdalen, Sweden, 142 km from the NORESS array.33 Seismic 
waveforms were compared with a known event over a narrow frequency band of 
14–18 Hz with optimal signal-to-noise. All ﬁve 1-ton chemical explosions were 
automatically detected by NORESS and NORSAR arrays during the course of a 
year, with a very low false alarm rate. The Spitzbergen array was able to detect 
rock bursts 50 km away. Correlation detection is limited to comparing signals 
coming from a footprint of 1–2 wavelengths, some 10 km at 1 Hz. Correlation 
events must exhibit little variation in source mechanism and time history. Cor­
relation detection can rule-out mining explosions and rule-in nuclear explosions 
at a given location. A very small signal to noise ratio is used for these detections. 
Assuming a false alarm probability of 10−6, Frode Ringdal and his NORSAR 
co-workers calculated the signal-to-noise ratio in decibels (with respect to 0 dB 
at SNR = 1) needed to obtain 90% detection probability: They obtain 7 dB for 
a single sensor (SNR = 5), −3 db for a 9-element array (SNR = 0.5), and from 
−15 dB to −20 dB for more complex conﬁgurations (SNR 0.03 to 0.01). When 
prior data exists, cross-correlation between waveforms are 10 to 100 times more 
accurate in determining locations than traditional timing methods. NORSAR 
gave these conclusions: 
We present evidence that correlators can be used to lower detection thresholds 
by 0.5 to 1 magnitude units over standard energy detection algorithms. Thus they 
offer roughly the same enhancement in detection performance that is achieved 
by replacing single sensors with arrays. This enhancement can be achieved in 
addition to the sensitivity increase afforded by arrays. The fact that correlators 
are speciﬁc to individual sources makes them attractive as event classiﬁers. This 
feature can be exploited to construct efﬁcient screens for mining explosions or 
earthquake aftershocks. 
INFRASOUND, HYDROACOUSTIC, AND RADIONUCLIDE 
MONITORING 
Infrasound 
Infrasound (0.01–10 Hz) has a marginal ability to detect small underground 
nuclear tests, but it can discriminate between atmospheric nuclear explosions 
and chemical explosions and earthquakes.34 Combining pressures at the node 
of an axial array of tubes reduces incoherent noise ﬂuctuations, although coher­
ent infrasound remains. Spatial triangulation is used to determine locations of 
atmospheric events, which can be superior to seismic locations if little energy is 
transmitted into the ground. IMS infrasound monitoring uses a sparse network 
with a 2500-km spacing. Large and small apertures are used to measure low fre­
quencies (0.03 to 0.1 Hz) and frequencies over 1 Hz. Time and frequency-based 
cross-correlations are used to obtain characteristics of the signal to discriminate 
between source mechanisms. Wind speed exacerbates wind noise, which rises 
by 20 dB if wind speed is raised from 1 m/s to 5 m/s. For underground events, 
the seismic network has much greater location accuracy than infrasound, but 
less than that of interferometric synthetic aperture radar on satellites if they 
observe the location of the test. The United States can detect atmospheric tests 
with bhangmeters in space, but the other nations that participated in CTBT 
negotiations selected infrasound sensors for the IMS because they did not have 
bhangmeters. The NAS panel concluded that the infrasound “two-station de­
tection thresholds are below 1 kt worldwide and below 0.5 kt on continents 
in the northern hemisphere.” NORSAR showed that there is a high correla­
tion between seismic signals and infrasound signals from mining explosions.35 
Detection of 0.019-kt chemical explosions have been observed at 2000 km, but 
detection capability can be signiﬁcantly reduced when the monitoring station is 
located upwind from the source or normal to the stratospheric wind direction.36 
The acoustic pressure at a node of tubes is governed by the speed of sound, 
which gives a frequency-dependent response. Two new approaches take advan­
tage of the fact that the speed of light gives a response that does not depend on 
frequency. 
Piezoelectric Sensors 
An array of 90 piezoelectric sensors is attached to tube walls of a three-arm 
infrasound detector.37 The digitized signals are combined and correlated with 
much greater sophistication and corrections than pressure addition at the node 
of an axial array. Noise power is reduced as the inverse of the number of sen­
sors when the signals are averaged and not correlated, but multiple correlated 
sensors reduce wind noise by more than the 1/n. 
Optic Fiber Infrasound Sensor (OFIS) 
An optical ﬁber is split into two ﬁbers, which are wound separately around 
a pliable tube, permitting the optical path to stretch as pressure deforms the 
tube. The change in path length is measured by interferometry with a laser 
pulse that is split into the two ﬁbers and combined at the other end prior to 
a photodetector. Integrated pressure is measured by combining the wave and 
its derivative, forming an ellipse.38 Preliminary experiments suggest that wind 
noise is reduced by 20 dB in low-wind conditions of 1 m/s wind between 1–10 
Hz. Temperature differences must be minimized to obtain good data, similar to 
traditional tube arrays. Optical polarization in the two ﬁbers should be similar, 
and not at right angles. A multiple-arm OFIS array has the potential to improve 
signal detection, source discrimination, and velocity direction. 
Hydroacoustic Monitoring 
Propagation of ocean acoustic waves has low dispersion and small loss rates 
when in the oceanic channel. Hydroacoustic sensors are used to discriminate 
between oceanic earthquakes and explosions (more power at 5–100 Hz). If an 
oceanic event lacks a robust explosive hydroacoustic signal, the event is surely 
an earthquake.39 Event locations deduced from hydroacoustic data are moder­
ately accurate (30 km at 1000 km with a horizontal array), but they complement 
more accurate locations obtained from seismology. The NAS panel concluded 
that hydroacoustic monitoring has a “yield threshold [of] just a few kilograms 
for most oceans in the Southern Hemisphere. Almost all the world’s ocean 
basins will be monitored down to better than one ton.”40 The IMS network of 
six hydrophone arrays and the ﬁve (less-capable) T-Phase41 stations will have a 
greater sensitivity in the Southern Hemisphere, whereas the seismic network 
is most sensitive in the Northern Hemisphere. The IDC developed the Hydroa­
coustic Azimuth and Slowness Estimator to discriminate source mechanisms 
and determine azimuthal location to within 1 degree with few false positives, 
keying to the bubble pulse signature of an explosion. 
Coupling explosive energy into the oceanic waveguide is very efﬁcient in 
deep oceans, but shallow oceans can block acoustic energy from reaching the 
oceanic waveguide. The 2004 Sumatra earthquake gave a much larger signal 
on the southern side of Diego Garcia as compared to its northern side (32 deci­
bel reduction at 20 Hz).42 In response to the tragic death of 300,000, the IMS 
network reduced its tsunami warning time from 2 hours to 20 minutes and has 
made its data available on a conﬁdential basis. Hydroacoustic blockage models 
determine travel times to within 0.1–5%, using underwater geography, temper­
ature, salinity, and surface roughness.43 Databases and experiments are being 
used to enhance these tools. 
Radionuclide Monitoring 
Detection of ﬁssion radionuclides gives deﬁnitive identiﬁcation that an 
event was a nuclear explosion, as was the case of the 2006 North Korean test 
(see Three Recent Nuclear-Test Events). Two days after the 0.6-kt test, 300 ra­
dioactive xenon nuclei were detected, conﬁrming that it was a nuclear test. The 
IMS station in the Northwest Territories of Canada contributed to this analysis. 
Information collected from radionuclide samplers takes days or weeks to collect 
and analyze. Soviet underground nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya vented 90% 
of the events between 1964 and 1988 and the United States also had venting 
problems for decades. Noble gas radionuclides (especially Xe) are particularly 
difﬁcult to conﬁne. The IMS radionuclide network is planned to provide detec­
tion if as little as 10 percent of radioactive noble gasses generated by a 1-kt 
underground explosion are vented. Because of advances described later, the 
NAS panel concluded that in many places this threshold is reduced by an order 
of magnitude. “Present estimates place a threshold limit of 0.1 to 1.0 kilotons 
for a nuclear explosion on the continents and a threshold limit of 1 to 2 kilotons 
on the oceans.”44 The panel further concluded that detection probability will ex­
ceed 90 percent across most of Europe and Asia and over 50 percent over most 
of the southern oceans. Locating a source is not precise because it depends on 
models using wind and weather data. 
Forty of 80 IMS radionuclide stations will monitor radioxenon isotopes. 
Prototype radioxenon detectors were built by France, Russia, and Sweden 
and the U.S. Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) developed the 
Automated Radioxenon Sampler/Analyzer (ARSA), which detects low-levels 
of four radioxenon isotopes. ARSA (1) collects air at very high rates, (2) 
uses high-efﬁciency gamma and beta coincident detectors, (3) minimizes back­
ground counts, (4) minimizes radon in separated xenon samples, (5) conducts 
short cycles of continuous separations with prompt subsequent analysis of the 
gas samples, and (6) functions without an operator and without signiﬁcant 
maintenance.45 The ARSA system reduces 40 m3 of air in 8 hours to about 10 
cm3 of gas that is 50% xenon and 50% nitrogen. This tour de force involves 
sophisticated xenon trapping, xenon puriﬁcation, xenon quantiﬁcation, and ra­
dioxenon measuring. The minimum detection concentration of Xe-133 is 0.1 
mBq/m3 (0.4 counts/m3-hour) and Xe-135 is 0.5 mBq/m3, which is an order of 
magnitude less than the 1 mBq/m3 goal (24-hour sampling). ARSA measure­
ments show that ambient levels of Xe-133 can vary signiﬁcantly near nuclear 
reactors from normal values of 0.7 to 1.5 mBq/m3 to over 20 mBq/m3. 
The IMS deploys both manual and automatic radionuclide systems. For 
example, PNNL also developed the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer 
(RASA), which is sensitive down to 1 million radioactive nuclei attached to 
aerosols or dust. This is 10−17 of the 1023 radionuclides produced from a 1-kt 
test. According to PNNL, a single RASA would eventually detect an atmo­
spheric explosion anywhere in the same hemisphere. A possible new sensor is 
being researched that separates aerosols on the basis of their size.46 This takes 
advantage of the fact that aerosols from atmospheric explosions have diameters 
less than 0.1 µm, and aerosols from underground explosions have diameters 
larger than 1 µm, whereas aerosols with natural radioactivity have diameters 
between 0.1 and 1 µm. In addition, traditional radioactive sampling during 
on-site inspections can determine if a nuclear test took place.47 
SPACE-BASED, INTERFEROMETRIC SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR 
Classiﬁed, space-based systems monitor optical, infrared, radar, nuclear-
particle, electromagnetic pulse, and communications signals. This article will 
discuss only the relatively new, interferometric synthetic aperture radar 
(InSAR). InSAR nicely complements IMS capabilities for the case of 1-kt tests 
at depths down to at least 500 meters. InSAR results are not nearly as timely 
as seismology, but the discrimination and location measurements can, in some 
cases, surpass that of seismology. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) produces de­
tailed images of surfaces, even when there is dense cloud cover. SAR satellites 
transmit radar pulses and receive the reﬂections as the satellite moves along its 
ﬂight path, synthesizing a large-aperture antenna. Signals reﬂected from the 
forward velocity direction have a positive Doppler shift, while signals received 
from the aft direction have a negative Doppler shift, creating a one-dimensional 
map. The second dimension comes from timing analysis. Longer collection and 
computer times increase the effective antenna size, which improves spatial res­
olution of SAR images. By combining SAR images taken at two different times 
at very similar orbital locations, InSAR images measure changes in topography 
(deformation) accurate to 0.2–0.5 centimeters. InSAR images of subsidence af­
ter underground tests at the Nevada and Lop Nor test sites have been obtained 
by Paul Vincent et al., using data from European Space Agency ERS and En­
visat satellites, as well as Canadian and Japanese satellites.48 SAR and InSAR 
can also discover site preparation and other evidence of nuclear testing. InSAR 
has been used to study subsidence above tunnels, land-use management, soil 
moisture, water pumping and river runoff (volume and sediment), sea surface 
heights, glacier thickness and dynamics, and real-time measurements of seis­
mological events. InSAR is now a widely adopted technology, available to all 
CTBT States Parties at reasonable prices from commercial vendors. Canadian 
Radarsat SAR data (8 m horizontal resolution, 50 km × 50 km) costs $3000, plus 
$1000 for a rush acquisition (29–60 hours in advance) and $1000 for near-real 
time acquisition (2–6 hours after reception).49 Sophisticated InSAR software 
costs $20–40,000. At some point there will be SAR data with 1-m horizontal 
resolution available from commercial sources, which will enhance InSAR reso­
lution. The United States has four Lacrosse SAR satellites, each visiting most 
ground sites twice a day. Data obtained from National Technical Means and 
cooperative measures (see Cooperative Monitoring at Test Sites) may be used 
by the CTBT Executive Council if obtained in accordance with international 
law to request an on-site inspection (Article IV.D.37). 
Reﬂected radar has two kinds of information, amplitude and phase, which 
InSAR combines at each pixel from data taken before and after an underground 
nuclear test. The result is an interference pattern map. Topography plus subsi­
dence are obtained in the second SAR viewing, but the interferometric image, 
when acquired from two nearly identical viewing locations, measures subsi­
dence after removal of topography.50 When the satellite returns to the same 
location above the Earth, the phase image should be the same if nothing has 
changed. If this is not true, then something happened, such as subsidence. The 
double-difference method uses three SAR images of the same scene. The inter­
ferogram obtained from the ﬁrst two SAR images is subtracted from the inter­
ferogram from the last two SAR images, to obtain a double-difference interfer­
ogram. By using several interferograms from different time spans, background 
contributions to subsidence from atmospheric and vegetation scattering can be 
minimized. Another approach, used by Vincent, obtains an interferogram from 
two SAR images, and then subtracts the digital elevation model (DEM) map, 
to obtain subsidence. These approaches measure subsidence with an accuracy 
of 0.2 cm (Nevada Test Site and Jubilee subway) and 0.5 cm in other locations. 
This approach is successful even when a visible crater is not formed. InSAR 
can discriminate between earthquakes (asymmetrical pattern) and explosions 
(circular pattern). InSAR data has a horizontal resolution of 30 meters, which 
is much smaller than typical crater diameters of 100 meters. InSAR has im­
proved location estimates for earthquakes by 20 km in some cases. The subsi­
dence diameter of about 1 km gives an area that is 100 times larger than visible 
craters. A typical radar frame covers 10,0000 square kilometers, sufﬁcient to 
search wide areas. InSAR can direct on-site inspections to better than 0.1 km to 
search for radioactivity and other testing evidence, a much more accurate foot­
print than the 1000 km2 allowed by CTBT to locate on-site inspections. Dynamic 
InSAR measurements can directly observe seismic waves during an event from 
airborne platforms, but this approach is too costly for CTBT monitoring. 
There are some three-dozen triple-axis seismometers located on or near the 
Nevada Test Site. The data for the three nuclear events in Figure 4 have local 
magnitudes and depth of burial as follows: Galena (3.91 ML, 401 meters), Di­
vider (4.39 ML, 340 m), and Victoria (2.65 ML, 244 m). These local magnitudes 
can be interpreted with the aid of the Nonproliferation Experiment (NPE), an 
Figure 4: Subsidence After Three 1992 Nuclear Tests at NTS. (Top) Digital elevation map with 
10-m resolution locates sites of underground tests (dots). (Center) Interference pattern 
displays a cycle of 2.8-cm vertical displacement, showing subsidence during the time 
interval between two SAR pictures. (Bottom) Proﬁle plots of near-vertical displacement (left 
scale) and surface topography (right scale). Galena (Left, 3.9 ML) and Divider (Middle, 4.4 
ML) show readily observable subsidence, whereas Victoria (Right, 2.7 ML) was not 
observable (P. Vincent, 2003). 
explosion of 1.4 kt of ammonium nitrate fuel oil (September 22, 1993, 4.06 ML, 
405 m). Jack Murphy concluded that chemical explosions couple twice as effec­
tively to seismic signals as tamped nuclear explosions with similar frequency 
components, giving a nuclear effective yield of 2.8 kt.51 Using the NAS con­
version for magnitude to yield, the readily observable Galena and Divider had 
yields of 2 kt and 6 kt, respectively, whereas the non-observable Victoria had 
a yield of 0.1 kt. Because Galena was very observable (Figure 4), InSAR can 
identify and locate nuclear tests of less than 1 kt at depths of 400 meters with a 
location accuracy of 100 meters if prior-test SAR data are available. This clearly 
strengthens CTBT monitoring. 
Long-term subsidence continues as underground damage relaxes with set­
tlement and closure of chimney voids, gravitational settlement of large detached 
Figure 5: Theory vs. InSAR Data. InSAR data from the Nevada Test Site (top) is compared to 
calculations with elastic, ﬁnite-element models (bottom) that take into account local 
geology. One color cycle is 2.8 cm (P. Vincent, 2003). 
zones, or slips on nearby faults (Figure 5). Vincent used InSAR to determine 
subsidence relaxation rates in mm/year for 11 nuclear tests over 20 kt that 
took place during 1989–92. These larger tests were at an average depth of 613 
m, producing local magnitudes between 5.03 and 5.75 (average of 5.4). Vincent 
showed that nuclear tests can be located when no SAR data existed prior to a 
test, allowing the characterization of 12 additional explosions. The initial sub­
sidence rates of 17 tests varied greatly between 0.43 and 6.95 cm/yr, caused by 
differing geology, explosion environments (tunnels and shafts), and time histo­
ries. The subsidence rate slows over time, with an exponential decay constant 
of about 0.01–0.06 per year, whereas test cavity over-pressure dropped from 42 
atmospheres to 37 atmospheres during 1992–99. The threshold to detect and 
identify tests without prior SAR data is over 20 kt, which is of marginal inter­
est for CTBT monitoring because seismology is extremely robust at that level. 
However, the 100-m location accuracy from InSAR is relevant. 
InSAR Limitations 
Unclassiﬁed SAR data can be obtained from foreign satellites, although the 
United States InSAR Working Group is planning an unclassiﬁed SAR satellite. 
InSAR sensitivity depends on test yield, test depth, site geometry (horizontal 
or vertical), and the ability of the local geological structure to support the cavity 
roof. InSAR measures subsidence to an accuracy of 0.2–0.5 cm with a threshold 
yield of less than 1 kt at depths of at least 400 meters when prior SAR data 
exists, and to about 20 kt when no prior SAR data exists. Previously undetected 
subsidence above London’s Jubilee Tunnel was observed to be linear with time 
with an accuracy of 0.2 cm from the scatter of individual measurements (Figure 
6).52 Relative subsidence is determined with respect to ﬁxed heights of neigh­
boring buildings or geological structures. The main source of error is caused 
by scattering ﬂuctuations from water vapor (not clouds), which is reduced by 
averaging over several data runs. Tree motion and vegetation and ice changes 
also contribute to errors. 
COOPERATIVE MONITORING AT TEST SITES 
Monitoring Near Experiments 
Inspector and inspected nations could cooperatively monitor (1) for small 
tests near a test site and (2) for sub-critical experiments at very close distances 
without compromising secrecy. The data could be released if both nations agree 
to do so. Sub-kiloton tests have a lesser military signiﬁcance, but cooperative, 
close-in monitoring greatly lowers monitoring thresholds, reducing suspicions. 
Cooperative measures can determine if an experiment is hydronuclear, which 
is a CTBT violation, or hydrodynamic, which is permitted.53 CTBT negotiations 
Figure 6: Jubilee-Line Subsidence. Site elevation above London’s Jubilee Line tunnel from 
InSAR reveals subsidence, which is linear with time (2 cm between 1993 and 2001 above 
the 20–m deep tunnel). Accuracy is better than 0.2 cm for a single measurement (G. 
Rennie, 2005). 
deﬁned hydronuclear tests as those having a nuclear yield of less than 4 pounds 
(1800 grams) TNT equivalent, whereas hydrodynamic tests do not reach nu­
clear criticality. Jones and von Hippel calculated integrated radiation doses 
at 2 meters distance for a variety of nuclear experiments, giving monitoring 
thresholds between µgram- and gram-equivalent.54 They concluded that coop­
erative monitoring “should be adequate to verify that nuclear yields greater 
than grams of TNT equivalent had not occurred, even allowing for the possibil­
ity of substantial shielding.” 
Hydrodynamic--Hydronuclear Threshold 
A test can be considered to be a legal hydrodynamic test if the neutron 
ﬂuence from ﬁssion is less than the naturally occurring spontaneous neutron 
ﬂuence. Four kg of weapons grade plutonium (6 percent plutonium-240) release 
2.2 × 105 spontaneous neutrons per second. This gives a neutron ﬂux at 2 m 
of 0.2/cm2-sec, when 50 percent of neutrons escape the device. A weekly read 
detector at 2 m receives 1.3 × 105/cm2, corresponding to 0.4 mg-equivalent. If 
the experiment doubles the normal dosimeter dose, ﬁssion yield of 0.4 mg must 
have taken place. Active interrogation can complicate matters. A beryllium­
americium-241 on-off source produces 108 neutrons per pulse, which gives a 
neutron ﬂuence of 100–1000/cm2, which could give a false positive. Pulsed neu­
tron generators (1011) and fast critical assemblies (1017) would further compli­
cate matters. These results show that passive dosimetry is accurate, less mis­
leading, and less political. The JASON panel estimated a monitoring limit of 
1-milligram equivalent (1 nanoton) could be obtained with passive dosimeters.55 
The JASONS concluded that active measurements using an external neutron 
source were not useful to determine if criticality took place since the source 
“would seriously interfere with other diagnostics, and could possibly produce a 
false positive measurement.” 
Monitoring Next to a Test Site 
The Intelligence Community wants enhanced capabilities to learn more 
about other countries, whereas the Defense Department wants less-capable 
measures to protect DoD secrets. The ultimate choice is a political compromise. 
A credible regime to monitor nuclear experiments within a km of the test site 
is described in what follows. 
Passive Seismic for Small Nuclear Tests 
The number of aftershocks following a nuclear test varies slightly with 
yield between 1 and 10 kt.56 Local seismographs placed within a few km of a 
nuclear explosion detect over 50 small aftershocks between magnitudes 1 and 
−2 after an explosion between magnitudes 4 and 5. Seismic detectors should be 
located in a quiet place, away from noisy machinery. Several seismometers at 
different locations can locate the seismic source. The United States routinely 
measured low magnitude aftershocks after nuclear tests down to −3 mb near 
the Nevada Test Site.57 This level corresponds to a passive seismic threshold of 
less than 10 kg (10−5 kt). It is useful to calibrate the test site with a few small 
chemical explosions, to better understand local seismic signals. Two technicians 
can install commercial systems in several days, which are relatively easy to 
operate. False positives from chemical explosions, rockbursts and rockfalls, and 
human activity can be ruled out with infrasound microphones. 
Radioxenon Detection 
Both the United States and the former Soviet Union have had considerable 
difﬁculty in preventing accidental releases of radioactive isotopes from nuclear 
tests. Noble gases (xenon-135, xenon-133, and argon-37) are particularly dif­
ﬁcult to constrain, giving a strong indication that a nuclear test took place 
(see Radionuclide Monitoring). The Automatic Radioxenon Sampler Analyzer 
(ARSA) lowered the threshold detection level by a factor of ten for radioxenon to 
0.1 mBq/m3 (0.4 counts/m3-hour). The Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer 
(RASA), deployed at IMS sites, has a threshold detection level of 0.01 mBq/m3. 
Unattended Video Monitoring 
Data obtained in near–real time can be stored and retrieved with telecom­
munications. Solid-state technology needs little maintenance. 
EMP Detection 
Criticality experiments emit an easily measurable electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) near the experiment. EMP from an underground nuclear test is highly 
absorbed by the ground. However, lower frequency components, which diminish 
as the fourth power of the distance, are observed if induction coils and antennae 
are located within 100 meters of a 0.1-kt test. Lightning gives an EMP, but this 
false signal can be negated with cooperative tests and by rejection circuitry for 
steady-state deployment. The frequency region below 10 kHz does not reveal 
weapons design information, but higher frequencies should be avoided because 
that region can reveal weapon design information. EMP measurements can 
play a unique role because a nuclear explosion gives a larger EMP signal than 
a chemical explosion of the same yield. 
THREE RECENT NUCLEAR-TEST EVENTS 
1997 Kara Sea Non-Event 
A small seismic event took place near the northern Novaya Zemlya (NZ) 
Test Site on August 16, 1997. Within days, nongovernmental seismologists lo­
cated the event 100 km from NZ in the Kara Sea at 400 m depth (Figure 7).58 
This location meant that the event was not a nuclear explosion, but an earth­
quake. However, two weeks later the Departments of State and Defense labeled 
the event as having “explosive characteristics” and a month after the event, U.S. 
agencies still characterized the event as “unresolved” or “lending itself to alter­
native interpretations.” This was an error by U.S. agencies and not by CTBTO. 
The Kara Sea seismic data from Northern Finland is shown in Figure 8, along 
with spectrum from a Soviet nuclear test at the northern NZTS. This data shows 
Figure 7: Location Accuracy of the Kara Sea Event. Locations of the NZTS and 
earthquakes (with magnitudes during 1986–1997) are shown with error ellipses for high 
conﬁdence (90%). NORSAR later showed the event of August 16, 1997 was located to 
within 1 km of its small aftershock (P. Richards and W.Y. Kim, 1997). 
Figure 8: Kara Sea Event vs. Nuclear Test Data. (left top) Soviet nuclear test of 24 October 
1990, detected at KEV seismic station in Northern Finland, 1048 km from the northern NZTS, 
and (left bottom) the Kara Sea event at a distance of 1127 km. The Kara Sea event had a 
much smaller P/S ratio between 3–9 Hz as compared to that of nuclear explosions (P. 
Richards and W.Y. Kim, 1997). 
that the Kara Sea event was an earthquake because the P/S ratio at higher fre­
quencies (2–9 Hz) is much lower than for nuclear explosions. Furthermore, the 
time delay between P and S waves is 8 seconds longer for the Kara Sea event, 
as compared to nuclear explosions at NZ, which implies that the event could 
not have been at the test site. Further conﬁrmation came from the small after­
shock (mb = 2.5), four hours after the Kara Sea event (mb = 3.5), detected by 
NORSAR (2320 km away) and Spitsbergen (1300 km away) arrays. Waveform 
correlation analysis showed that the source mechanism for the two events was 
the same for both events and it showed the two event locations were closer than 
1 km.59 There were six independent methods showing that the event was an 
earthquake and not a nuclear test: (1) P/S ratio, (2) amplitude at high frequency 
(3–9 Hz), (3) location, (4) S-P time difference, (5) similarity of aftershock data, 
and (6) waveform similarity to a 1986 earthquake at the same location. The 
Kara Sea event showed that array monitoring is robust to less than 2.5 mb 
(0.01 kt) in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya. 
Indian and Pakistani 1998 Tests 
The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 11, 28, and 30 were automat­
ically detected and located by the Prototype IDC within 1 hour, without being 
screened out by the IDC automatic process. Seismic data were detected by 62 
stations, used by the prototype IDC, including the regional station at Nilore, 
Pakistan.60 Eight regional stations in the completed IMS network would be 
expected to detect events of this type with a capability down to 2.5 mb. The test 
sites for the May 11 and May 28 events were readily located with commercial 
satellite images with 5-meter resolution by comparing pre- and post-images. 
The May 11 seismic signal had a signal-to-noise ratio greater than 1000 at 
Nilore. The yields of the multiple tests (perhaps 1 km apart) were one-fourth 
of what was claimed by India and Pakistan, lowering the May 11 Indian yield 
estimate from 55 kt to 12 kt (9–16 kt, 95% conﬁdence, mb 5.0), the May 13 
Indian event (<mb 2.5) from 0.8 kt to 0.03 kt,61 the May 28 Pakistani event 
from 30–35 kt to 9 kt (6–13 kt, mb 4.9), and the May 30 event from no-claim to 
4 kt (2–8 kt, mb 4.3). The lower yield estimates diminish the Indian claim of a 
signiﬁcant hydrogen weapon. 
North Korean Test of October 9, 2006 
The 0.6-kt, North-Korean test was promptly detected and identiﬁed at seis­
mic stations in Australia, Europe, North America, and Asia.62 Over 20 IMS 
seismic stations detected the blast. The U.S. Geological Survey took ﬁve hours 
to obtain a good estimate of the test location. Figure 9 displays the spectra for 
two magnitude 4 events, the October explosion at a distance of 373 km and 
an earthquake at 342 km. The October signal was identiﬁed as an explosion 
because of the large P wave (pressure wave) amplitude and weak S wave (shear 
wave) amplitude, compared to the small P wave amplitude for the earthquake. 
The regional seismic data was obtained by a non-IMS, Chinese—U.S. operated 
station in Mudanjiang, China, showing that CTBT monitoring is improved with 
Figure 9: North Korean 2006 Test, Earthquake, and Chemical Explosion. Seismograms with 
vertical ground velocity in micrometers per second recorded at Mudanjiang, China. [top] 
North Korean test (October 9, 2006, magnitude 4, distance of 373 km, 0.7 kt), [middle] 
earthquake (December 16, 2004, magnitude 4, 342 km), [bottom] small underground 
chemical explosion (August 19, 1998, magnitude 1.9, 289 km, 0.002 kt). The strong P-wave 
amplitude in the October 9, 2006 trace shows the event was an underground explosion. 
The waveform for the small chemical explosion has the same structure as the data from 
the underground nuclear test (P. Richards and W. Y. Kim, 2007). 
nearby stations. Because this was a ﬁrst test, it was not surprising that radioac­
tive xenon gas was detected. The ofﬁce of the Director of National Intelligence 
Public Affairs announced that “radioactive debris” was then detected two days 
after the test. The IMS station at Yellow Knife, Canada detected enhanced lev­
els of Xe-133 12 days later proving that the event was a nuclear explosion. The 
high signal-to-noise ratio shows that the detection threshold level is much less 
than 0.6 kt. The data from four 1998 underground chemical tests at a distance 
of 289 km was used by Richards and Kim to determine the threshold level of 
0.002 kt for that region, a factor of 50 below the NAS limit of 0.1 kt. 
CONCLUSIONS ON MONITORING PROGRESS SINCE 1999 
In the early 1990s, the CTBT monitoring was expected to have a 1-kt threshold, 
but technical advances have lowered this expected threshold to 0.1-kt, and lower 
in certain regions. The lowered threshold is not surprising since earlier studies 
predicted this trend as technology, analysis, and regional access improved. The 
National Academy of Sciences results were based on both teleseismic and re­
gional monitoring, with additional capabilities from arrays. CTBT monitoring 
advances since 1999 are as follows: 
The National Academy of Sciences CTBT study (discussed earlier) con­
cluded that the fully completed IMS will reliably detect and identify under­
ground nuclear explosions to 0.1 kt in hard rock, anywhere in Asia, Europe, 
North Africa, and North America. For most of Europe, Asia, and Northern 
Africa, the detection threshold is in the range of 0.03–0.06 kt in hard rock, and 
in some locations to less than 0.01 kt with arrays and regional seismology. An 
explosion in a cavity above 1–2 kt cannot be conﬁdently hidden, and it could be 
hidden at that level only with great difﬁculty. Atmospheric nuclear explosions 
can be detected and identiﬁed above 0.5–1 kt. Underwater nuclear explosions 
in the ocean can be detected and identiﬁed to 0.001 kt or lower. Nuclear explo­
sions in the upper atmosphere and near space can be detected and identiﬁed for 
yields above 1 kt to 100 million kilometers from Earth. 
Arrays of seismographs (see section on Seismic Arrays) can detect and iden­
tify events to a threshold of 2–2.5 mb from over 2000 km away, corresponding 
to explosive yields less than 0.01 kt for tamped explosions and less than 1 kt 
for an explosion decoupled in a large cavity. 
Regional monitoring with Pn, Lg, and coda waves (see Regional Seismology 
Monitoring) is encouraging. Regional spectra contain much more information 
than narrowband magnitudes. New algorithms, closer access, and seismic mod­
els enhance the ability to discriminate between seismic sources and improve 
location estimates below 3.5 mb. Using old Soviet data taken 500–1500 km 
from Semipalatinsk Test Site, all but two tests over one ton were detected. Re­
gional seismic data obtained near North Korea show that the regional-seismic 
threshold is 0.002 kt for that region. 
Further conclusions are as follows: !	 Seismic thresholds can be lowered by 0.25–0.5 mb if the 120 IMS auxiliary 
stations (see International Monitoring System) are operated and analyzed in 
near–real time.63 Additional primary stations could become array stations. !	 IMS data could be shared with the Global Seismic Network and other rel­
evant seismic stations (discussed further in International Monitoring Sys­
tem), increasing available data from close-in sites, and improving CTBTO 
analysis with additional seismic experts. !	 Correlation detection (see Seismic Arrays) can lower thresholds by 0.5–1.0 
mb. This approach is extremely useful for former test sites and is being 
extended to earthquake data, such as the 1997 Kara Sea event. It will take 
a decade to implement this approach much more widely. !	 Cross-correlation (see Seismic Arrays) of seismic waveforms can reduce lo­
cation uncertainties in seismically active regions by a factor of 10 to 100, as 
compared to estimates based on arrival times of seismic waves. Additional 
work over the next decade should enhance this approach. !	 Radionuclide detection (see Radionuclide Monitoring) is an order of magni­
tude better than expected by using the Automatic Radioxenon Sampler An­
alyzer (ARSA) and the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler and Analyzer (RASA). !	 Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (see Space-Based, Interferomet­
ric Synthetic Aperture Radar) can, under certain conditions, measure subsi­
dence after a nuclear test with an accuracy of 0.2–0.5 cm and with location 
accuracy of 100 m. InSAR can discriminate between earthquakes and explo­
sions on the basis of the symmetry of the subsidence pattern. The detection 
threshold for InSAR is less than 1 kt at 500 m depth if prior SAR data is 
available. Without prior SAR data, the InSAR threshold is above 20 kt. In-
SAR and SAR can detect test-site activity. Seismic data can be used to direct 
InSAR measurements. !	 Cooperative monitoring (see Cooperative Monitoring at Test Sites) near test 
sites can detect yields less than 10 kg by using passive-seismic, infrasound, 
EMP, and video sensors. Dosimeters placed two meters from experiments 
can detect ﬁssion and fusion yields of less than 1 gram-equivalent, without 
revealing nuclear secrets. !	 Open Skies ﬂights could be extended to more nations to enhance their ability 
to participate more fully. 
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